Trade Policy as an Exogenous Shock: Focusing on the Specifics by Greenland, Andrew & Lopresti, John W.
Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 
6-16-2021 
Trade Policy as an Exogenous Shock: Focusing on the Specifics 
Andrew Greenland 
Elon University, agreenland@elon.edu 
John W. Lopresti 
College of William and Mary, jwlopresti@wm.edu 
Upjohn Institute working paper ; 21-349 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Citation 
Greenland, Andrew and John Lopresti. 2021. "Trade Policy as an Exogenous Shock: Focusing on the 
Specifics." Upjohn Institute Working Paper 21-349. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp21-349 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 
Upjohn Institute working papers are meant to stimulate discussion and criticism among the 
policy research community. Content and opinions are the sole responsibility of the author. 
 
Trade Policy as an Exogenous Shock: Focusing on the Specifics 
 














This paper proposes a novel strategy for identifying the effects of import competition on 
economic outcomes that avoids standard concerns related to the endogeneity of trade policy and 
provides a consistent measure of exposure to trade over time. Conditioning on the level of import 
tariffs, our approach exploits cross-industry differences in the relative importance of specific 
rather than ad valorem tariffs. As they are expressed in per unit terms rather than as a share of 
value, the effective protection provided by a given specific tariff varies with price levels. Using 
digitized tariff line data between 1900 and 1940, we relate inflation-driven changes in trade 
protection to changes in imports and labor market outcomes in the full count U.S. census. We 
show that our measure predicts import growth at both the industry and county level. Using our 
measure as an instrument, we show that import competition reduces labor force participation in 
traded sectors during this period. Labor market effects are widespread but fall most heavily on 
those with little experience or fewer outside labor market options: the young, seniors, and those 
in rural areas. 
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1 Introduction
Increasingly, economists have turned their attention to international trade not only as an important
phenomenon in its own right, but as a potential source of causal identification more broadly.
Changes in trade flows create meaningful variation in economic conditions across industries, firms,
and workers, which can then serve as a test bed to answer questions beyond trade specifically.1
However, the usefulness of trade as a source of identification has thus far been limited by both
the endogenous nature of trade policy and the relative infrequency of large trade agreements. As
such, much of the focus in this literature has centered on once-in-a-generation supply side shocks
and a handful of abrupt changes to trade policy as sources of exogenous variation in trade flows.2
Furthermore, the unique nature of each trade agreement makes comparisons across long periods of
time difficult, limiting the time frame amenable to study in any given application. In this paper
we propose a method to identify causal effects of trade on economic outcomes in the absence of
these infrequent, idiosyncratic events. Our measure is consistent over time and can be applied to
any country or time period featuring two elements: per unit tariffs and price variation.
Our approach takes as given—and conditions on—the level of tariff protection and exploits
variation in the extent to which this protection is implemented via specific—that is, nominal per
unit—tariffs rather than on a percentage, or ad valorem basis. When a given tariff code is spec-
ified, identical levels of protection can be achieved with either type of duty. However, as price
levels change over time, the effective protection provided by specific tariffs will vary inversely with
the price, while the effective protection afforded by ad valorem tariffs remains constant. Thus,
temporal price variation in conjunction with preexisting differences across industries in the preva-
lence of specific tariffs generates quasi-random variation in effective tariff protection in the periods
between trade liberalizations. We leverage this variation to explore the labor market consequences
of exposure to imports in the United States from 1900 to 1940.
We present visual evidence of the mechanism employed in the paper in Figure 1. Here, each of
the five distinct U.S. trade policy regimes of the early twentieth century is represented by a distinct
1See, e.g., Chetverikov et al. (2016), Feler and Senses (2017), and Pierce and Schott (2020) for recent examples of
this approach.
2See Trefler (1993) for a discussion of confounding labor market effects. For attempts to circumvent these via
supply side shocks or policy changes, see, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013); Pierce and Schott (2016); Fajgelbaum,
Goldberg, Kennedy, and Khandelwal (2020).
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colored vertical band.3 The dashed line represents annual real imports, indexed to the year 1900,
while the solid black line depicts the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff rate, defined as the ratio of
total duties to total imports. Naturally, across policy regimes we observe considerable changes in
both average tariffs and trade flows. This type of cross-regime variation is the source of identification
exploited in virtually all of literature on trade policy and economic outcomes. However, there is
considerable nonpolicy variation in the AVE tariff rate across years within a given policy regime.
Further, we observe that this within-regime variation is strongly and negatively correlated with
inflation rates, depicted by gray bars. Periods with high inflation tend to be periods with low
average tariff rates and high import growth conditional on the preexisting tariff regime. In this
paper, we argue that the relationship is causal: in the presence of specific tariffs, inflation erodes
the protective capacity of the existing tariff schedule, resulting in increased imports and attendant
effects on other economic outcomes.
Figure 1: Real Imports, AVE, and Inflation: 1900–1940
NOTE: AVE and Import values from the USITC. Imports deflated using to a 1900 base year. Real imports and AVE indexed
to 100 in 1900. Vertical bands indicate the years encompassed by Dingley Tariff of 1897, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, the
Underwood Tariff of 1913, the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, respectively.
3These regimes correspond to the Dingley Tariff of 1897, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, the Underwood Tariff
of 1913, the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.
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To test this idea directly, we construct a novel database covering the universe of product-level
import values and duties by duty type by digitizing editions of Foreign Commerce and Naviga-
tion of the United States for every 10 years between 1900 and 1930. After manually concording
several thousand tariff lines to more aggregate industries, we construct an industry-level measure
of inflation-driven changes in effective protection. We relate this measure to both industry and
county-level trade flows, and ultimately to changes in county-level labor market outcomes between
censuses (Bartik, 1991).
We begin by documenting key stylized facts surrounding tariffs in our data. First, specific tariffs
are used extensively as a source of protection during this period. They account for 70 percent of all
duties collected in the first year of our sample, dropping to 40 percent in the 1920s and returning to
67 percent with the implementation of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930. Second, there is substantial
variation in the industry-level use of specific duties conditional on the chosen AVE tariff level of
protection, across both time and industries. Notably, specific tariffs tend to be more heavily utilized
in agricultural and food-related products. Given the geographic clustering of such industries, there
is thus substantial variation across regions in the relative protection provided by specific rather
than ad valorem tariffs. Third, when combined with inflation dynamics, the share of total industry
duties generated by specific tariffs (the industry’s specific tariff share [STS]) predicts aggregate
changes in industry imports, even conditioning on the overall level of industry protection. This is
true both at the industry level and when weighting industries by their respective labor share at the
county level.
We then use the full count U.S. census from 1900 to 1940 to estimate the effects of changes
in import exposure on labor market outcomes at the county level.4 We employ a shift share
IV research design in which we instrument for county-level import growth with an employment-
weighted average of industry specific tariff shares interacted with inflation. We find that increasing
import exposure leads to reductions in labor force participation and occupational income scores. To
ameliorate concerns that our results may be driven by heterogeneous exposure to large, aggregate
shocks including World War I and the Great Depression, we show that our findings are robust to
sequentially omitting each decade in our sample. Further, our results are robust to alternative
4In ongoing work, we are extending this analysis to the individual level using linked full count census data between
1900 and 1940.
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weighting of tradable versus nontradable industries (Kovak, 2013).
Finally, we explore the effects of import exposure on sectoral employment shifts and population
adjustments, as well as heterogeneity across demographic groups. We find that import exposure
is associated with declines in manufacturing, agricultural, and transportation employment, with
smaller positive effects on construction and mining. There is no statistically significant relationship
between imports and county population growth. We find that the bulk of the negative labor force
participation effect falls on young individuals and those who live in rural areas, while the negative
income effects are larger among older, urban populations. This is consistent with individuals at the
lower end of the income ladder being driven from the labor force entirely, while those with higher
initial incomes see their occupational standing deteriorate, but are more likely to remain in the
labor force.
Our approach draws heavily from the insights of Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1998), who argue
that intrapolicy variation in the AVE tariff rate is considerable and is related to both specific
tariffs and inflation. Crucini (1994) tracks the tariffs dictated by law for a panel of 30 commodities
between 1900 and 1940 and documents price-driven variation in the ad valorem average tariff
compared to the rate specified by policy. Irwin (1998) demonstrates that the aggregate U.S. AVE
rate varies substantially with inflation, even accounting for trade policy regimes. He concludes
that inflation-driven deterioration of specific tariffs contributes substantially to falling tariff rates
over time. While these studies inform our approach, we extend the existing work along several
important dimensions.5
First, we greatly expand coverage of traded economic activity by digitizing the universe of
product-level imports for a subset of years during this period. This allows us to measure the
reliance on specific tariffs directly. To the extent that existing work has considered specific tariffs
at all, it has done so either by looking for indirect evidence of their effects at the aggregate level or
directly within a small subset of products. Second, we provide direct evidence of the relationship
between inflation and trade in the presence of specific tariffs. Finally, we demonstrate that this
mechanism can be used to capture—and measure the effect of—labor market trade shocks.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the political economy of trade and endogenous
5Less directly, we also connect to work emphasizing the importance of per unit trade costs (Hummels and Skiba,
2004; Eaton et al., 2014).
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protection. The primary difficulty in identifying the relationship between trade policy and economic
outcomes is that each depends upon the other—politicians respond to economic conditions, which
respond to policies, which are determined by politicians (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Hiscox,
2002; McLaren, 2016). By exploiting quasi-random variation in price levels in the presence of
specific tariffs, our approach circumvents this concern to some extent. While it is possible or even
likely that omitted variables such as political influence or expected wage growth affect average tariff
levels, it is less clear how such conditions would map to the use of specific rather than ad valorem
tariffs conditional on the AVE tariff. In such an environment trade will respond to policy, but not
necessarily in a way that politicians could accurately forecast.6 In ongoing work parallel to this,
we use the measure developed here to estimate the effect of import competition on congressional
voting on trade bills during the twentieth century (Greenland, Howell, and Lopresti, 2021).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we provide a simple description of specific tariff
induced variation in effective protection, document stylized facts about trade and duties from 1900
to 1930, and construct and describe our primary measure. We also provide evidence of the impact
of inflation on the AVE prices their combined effects on imports. Section 3 details the effects
of import competition on labor force participation. Section 4 explores alternative labor market
outcomes and heterogeneity across demographic groups. Section 5 outlines additional applications
for our approach and concludes.
2 Empirical Approach: Inflation and Effective Trade Protection
Our ultimate interest is identifying the effects of import competition on economic outcomes over
time, whether or not there is a formal change to trade policy. To that end, we build on the literature
exploiting preexisting variation in local exposure to changes in trade policy as a source of exogenous
variation in labor market conditions. The primary concern with this approach, acknowledged
widely in the literature on trade and local labor markets, relates to the potentially endogenous
relationship between industry imports and economic outcomes. For example, technology shocks
that affect industry employment might also drive imports, biasing estimates of the effect of imports
6Moreover, Irwin (1998) documents a strong party preference for duty type. Republicans were concerned with
importers intentionally undervaluing their shipments to avoid duties. Such behavior was thought to put national
budget balances at risk and consequently motivated Republicans to prefer specific tariffs.
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on employment. Previous studies have largely addressed this by appealing to the specifics of a
distinct trade shock, attempting to isolate exogenous growth in the supply of trade (Autor et al.,
2013) or abrupt policy changes (Topalova, 2007; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak,
2017; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). Because our interest is in outcomes over a long and continuous
period, we adopt an alternative strategy.
Specifically, our approach exploits unintended variation in effective protection resulting from
the pervasive use of per unit, or specific tariffs. Import tariffs are expressed in either specific or
ad valorem—that is, percentage—terms. A crucial difference between these tariff types lies in the
effective protection they provide as aggregate prices fluctuate. To see the point clearly, suppose
that each product p in industry i is potentially subject to specific tariff fp ≥ 0 and ad valorem





























where sip is the share of imports in industry i accounted for by product p. Intuitively, the industry-
wide AVE is the weighted average across products of the sum of the ad valorem tariff, τp, and
the AVE of the specific tariff, fp/pp.
7 Holding constant the product shares, sip, and the policy
variables, fp and τp, we can define the change in effective protection ∆EPit0,1 as the change in the
AV Ei driven solely by aggregate price variation. Specifically, suppose products are subject to a
7As is clear from the last line of Equation (1), policymakers can target a given level of protection using either τp,
fp/p, or some combination of the two.
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uniform ι percent price change between t0 and t1:












































Controlling directly for the initial ad valorem level in industry i, AV Eit0 , we can calculate
changes in effective tariff protection as a function of the percentage price change between t0 and
t1 and the ratio of specific duties to total duties at time t0 in industry i, STSit0 , referred to as an





Intuitively, inflation will have no effect on specific tariffs, which are fixed in nominal terms by
law, so the relative restrictiveness of such tariffs declines as prices rise and vice versa. Ad valorem
tariffs, on the other hand, remain equally restrictive as prices change since they are expressed as a
share of goods’ value. Thus, as prices increase—that is, for positive ι—industries with higher specific
tariff shares will experience reduced effective protection, even conditioning on the initial tariff
level. This is the key insight for our identification strategy. As noted above, while politicians may
respond to political influence or economic conditions in setting tariff levels—protecting politically
important sectors or those at risk of decline, for instance—it is less obvious how such considerations
would affect the choice of specific rather than ad valorem tariffs conditional on the overall level of
protection. As the effective protection afforded by specific rather than ad valorem tariffs depends
on the direction of price movements, endogenous trade policy along this dimension would require
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an accurate forecast of future aggregate price changes.
2.1 Trade, Ad Valorem Equivalents, and Specific Tariff Shares in the United
States from 1900 to 1940
As outlined above, our identification comes from changes in effective tariff protection driven by
cross-sectional variation in specific tariff shares and temporal variation in aggregate price levels.
To operationalize this idea, we construct a novel database of tariffs and trade flows in the United
States from 1900 to 1940 by digitizing annual editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States
and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for select years. From these we obtain
information on the value of imports, duties collected, and the type of duty at the tariff line level.
Both ad valorem and specific duties are used extensively throughout our sample, though the
relative importance of each type varies substantially both across industries and over time. In Figure
2 we display the kernel density of log import values, which we assign to three mutually exclusive
categories: those that are duty free, those that are exclusively ad valorem, and those having any
specific tariff.8
8Many tariffs are specified to include both a specific and ad valorem component. We classify these as specific
tariffs.
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Figure 2: Value of Imported Line Items by Dutiable Status
NOTE: Tariff line trade values and dutiable status from annual editions of the Statistical Abstract of the
Untied States and the Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
In both 1900 and 1910, specific tariffs are more prevalent among products with smaller import
flows. By 1920 duties had fallen dramatically as a result of the Underwood Tariff of 1913—both in
terms of overall protection and the proportion of trade accounted for by specific tariffs. The Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 reversed this pattern, increasing protection overall and reestablishing
the widespread use of specific tariffs. While these policy changes are important, and we control for
the overall level of protection in our analysis, it is the cross-industry differences in the prevalence
of specific tariffs that offers our primary source of identifying variation.
There are on average approximately 3,500 tariff lines annually in the data. We concord these
data to the two-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level.9 For each industry
we calculate both AVE and STS at the beginning of the decade based on the trade policy in place
at the time.10 As a way of better understanding the variation in the data, consider for example
the extremes of protectionism as of 1910. Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 56) enter the U.S. duty
9We aggregate slightly to facilitate matching across years and data sources. We are left with 32 distinct two-digit
SITC revision two categories.
10We currently have digitized data only as far back as 1905. As a result, we use the specific tariff shares as of 1905
to represent 1900. Both years fell under the Dingley Tariff of 1897. In future versions of the paper we intend to
digitize earlier years and use 1900 directly.
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free under the Payne-Aldrich tariff of 1909, while beverages and tobacco face an AVE of 77.2
percent, consisting entirely of specific tariffs. Due to the staggering 120 percent inflation between
1910 and 1920—roughly 7.8 percent annually—beverage and tobacco experience a substantial trade
liberalization relative to fertilizers, for which the level of effective protection remains fixed at zero.
Consequently, we anticipate a relative increase in imports in beverages and tobacco.
Not all of our variation lies at these extremes, of course. For instance, consider animal and
vegetable oils (SITC 54) relative to pharmaceutical products and medicines (SITC 43). As of 1910,
both industries face an AVE rate of protection around 9 percent. However, the share of specific
tariffs in oils is twice as high as the share in pharmaceutical products. In the face of rising prices,
the effective rate of protection for pharmaceuticals remains much higher during the subsequent
decade than that of oils, despite the fact that they share the same average initial tariff level.
To summarize this variation more completely, in Figure 3 we display the relationship between
the AVE, STS, and import share by decade from 1900 to 1940. Each circle reflects an SITC
industry, with the size being proportional to the share of imports. On the horizontal axis we plot
the AVE tariff for that industry, while the vertical axis depicts the industry’s specific tariff share.
Additionally, we plot the overall AVE as a vertical red dashed line. The vertical black line indicates
a 50 percent AVE to emphasize differences in scale across years.
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Figure 3: STSi versus AV Ei by SITC-2 and Year
NOTE: Figure displays the Specific Tariff Share (STSi) versus the Ad Valorem Equivalent (AV Ei) for each
decade by SITC-2 industry. Vertical line indicates a 50 percent AVE tariff. Marker size proportional to
share of start of period imports.
Between 1900 and 1910, the overall AVE rate declines modestly from 24 percent to 21 percent,
before plummeting to 6.3 percent by 1920. The onset of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 increases
the level back to 13 percent. Though it needn’t be the case, the AVE and STS are positively
correlated in each year save the 1920s.11 Yet, for any given level of protection there is substantial
variation in the extent to which it is provided by specific tariffs. This variation allows us to
identify outcomes through changes in effective protection while controlling for the intended level
of protection (AVE). Before turning to our labor market outcomes, we provide evidence of the
11The correlation coefficient between STS and AVE ranges from 0.15 to 0.4.
11
importance of inflation-driven changes in effective protection both within and across sectors.
2.2 Effective Protection and Industry Imports
Here we relate changes in effective protection (as defined in Equation [2]) to changes in log imports
at the industry level. This requires data on industry level imports as well as price levels. Our import
data come from annual editions of both the Statistical Abstract of the United States and Foreign
Commerce and Navigation of the United States. These data are reported in product groups that we
manually concord to the two-digit SITC Revision 2 classifications.12 We also collect aggregate price
data from from two distinct sources. In our baseline results we use U.S. consumer price indices
from the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database.13 As robustness, we employ import price
data from the census volume Historical Statistics of the United States.14
Figure 4: Imports and CPI, 1900–1940
Figure 4 displays the evolution of price levels throughout our sample, as well as aggregate real
imports. As is clear from the figure, both prices and imports rise for the first half of our sample,
12There are approximately 86 product groups in the Statistical Abstract, and between 94 and 131 in Foreign
Commerce and Navigation. We aggregate concord to 32 distinct two-digit SITC categories to match to our measures
of protection STS and AVE.
13http://www.macrohistory.net/data/
14Specifically, the data come from Series 225-258 in Chapter U at https://www.census.gov/library/
publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1970.html.
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then fall throughout the second half due to the depression of 1920–1921 and the Great Depression.
We begin by documenting that cross-industry variation in specific tariffs does in fact meaning-
fully affect the level of effective protection. One may be concerned, for instance, that inflation leads
to within-industry substitutions in such a way that measured protection is left unaffected. As our
analysis is conducted at the industry level, such cross-product adjustments are a serious concern.
Figure 5: ∆AV E, ∆EP , and ∆Ln(Imports)
NOTE: Figure relates changes in effective protection driven solely by inflation −ι1+ιSTSit to the industry
AVE tariff. Marker size proportional to share of start of period imports. SITC-2 indicated. Second panel
compares AVE to decadal change in log industry imports.
A visual inspection of Figure 5 alleviates this concern. As expected, the measured change in
industry AVE, driven both by inflation and changes in product shares, is strongly correlated with
portion driven solely by inflation and pre-existing specific tariff shares. Over 45 percent of the varia-
tion in ∆AV E can be attributed to ∆EP .15 Further, these observed changes in AVE are negatively
related to import growth. Thus, not only do price fluctuations generate meaningful variation in
15Omitted for brevity, this relationship obtains after accounting for industry and year fixed effects and controlling
for the level of AVE and is significant at (p = 0.043).
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effective protection, but this variation leads to meaningful changes in industry imports. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first direct evidence of inflation-driven trade tariff protection, a
concept proposed a quarter century ago by Crucini (1994) and Irwin (1998), affecting trade flows.16
As we conduct the bulk of our formal analysis at the level of the local labor market, we must
map these trade flows to the census industry classifications.17 Here, we provide evidence that
the dynamics highlighted above are also observed at this level of aggregation. In Table 1, we
regress the change in log imports, ∆Ln(Imports)it,t+1, against the change in effective protection,
∆EPit,t+1, every 10 years from 1900 and 1940 at the census industry level. In columns 1–3 we use
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to construct price changes, while in columns 4–6 we use import
unit values. As shown in column 1, the relationship is negative, as predicted, and statistically
significant. As inflation increases, effective protection falls and imports rise. The point estimate
implies that a 10 percent increase in prices corresponds to an increase in imports of approximately
10.7 percent for an industry at the 75th percentile in terms of its specific tariff share relative to an
industry at the 25th percentile. The average decadal change in industry imports throughout our
sample is approximately 17 percent, so this is a meaningful effect.
Table 1: Industry Import Growth and Changes in Effective Protection
∆Ln(Importsit,t+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆EPit,t+1 -2.383
∗∗∗ -2.388∗∗∗ -2.334∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗ -0.863∗∗∗ -0.894∗∗∗
(0.644) (0.592) (0.626) (0.271) (0.247) (0.283)
STSit -0.178 -0.175 -0.127 0.169 0.223 0.443
(0.169) (0.165) (0.339) (0.215) (0.183) (0.279)
AV Eit -0.015 0.887 -0.188 0.396
(0.310) (1.181) (0.274) (1.135)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE N N Y N N Y
Price Index CPI CPI CPI Unit Values Unit Values Unit Values
NOTE: Dependent variable log change in industry imports at the county level across from 1900–
1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Data from Statistical Abstract of the United States and
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calculations. AVE, STS
measured at the start of decade. Regressions are weighted by industry imports as of 1900. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
16We do not have the tariff line data in 1940 to calculate the true change in AVE from 1930–1940 and thus omit
it from the graphs above. Nonetheless, because our variation comes from start of period specific tariff shares, we are
able to examine trade and labor market changes through 1940.
17Specifically, we map the two-digit SITC categories to HS 1992 categories using the concordance provided by the
United Nations (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/classifications/correspondence-tables.asp). We then
concord these to four-digit 1987 SIC categories following Pierce and Schott (2012). Finally, we concord these to
census industries using the concordance provided by James Lake (http://p2.smu.edu/jlake/data_code.html).
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To the extent that the specific tariff share varies with the average level of tariffs, our estimates
will capture the differential response across industries as a function of both tariff structure and tariff
levels, and will thus be biased. We address this concern in column 2 by introducing an additional
control for the start of period AVE in each industry i, AV Ei,t0 . Our results are unchanged by this
addition. Finally, in column 3 we introduce industry fixed effects to capture persistent differences in
import penetration growth across industries throughout this time period. Again, the point estimate
on ∆EPit,t+1 is unaffected. Because industry imports ultimately impact aggregate price levels, one
might worry that the CPI is an endogenous function of the level of protection. This would bias
our estimates. We address this in columns 4–6 by using import unit values to construct changes
in prices. To the extent that changes in import prices primarily reflect export market shocks, this
mitigates concerns regarding reverse causality. As can be seen in the table, the change does reduce
the magnitude of the point estimate substantially—by nearly two-thirds. However, the relationship
remains negative, economically meaningful, and statistically significant.
3 Local Trade Exposure
In order to explore labor market responses to trade, we now turn to the local level. Our data on
local characteristics and outcomes come from the full count decennial census, available through
IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2020). We focus here on average outcomes at the county level. In ongoing
work, we also plan to take advantage of linked individual data available through the Census Linking
Project to estimate the effect on specific individuals, and to follow the trajectory of individuals in
response to trade shocks over time.18
We begin by aggregating industry exposure to the level of the county. In order to create
county-specific measures of trade exposure, we concord the industry classifications described above
to census employment data, which are reported by 1990 census industries. For each county c, we







As above, ∆Ln(Imports)it,t+1 is the change in log imports in industry i between decadal cen-
18https://censuslinkingproject.org/
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suses. Similarly, we construct a county-level measure of changes in effective tariff protection by







Where ι is the increase in price levels from t to t+ 1. As is standard in the literature, we fix labor
shares and duties at their start-of-period values in order to avoid concerns regarding endogenous
policy responses to labor market outcomes.19 As noted above, in our analysis we will addition-
ally control for the start of period AVE AV Ect, constructed as an employment-weighted average
of TotalDutiesitImportsit across industries within a county. Our cross sectional variation thus comes from
differences in the county-average specific tariff shares conditional on average tariff levels. We again
emphasize the plausible exogeneity of such a measure—endogenous policy setting in this environ-
ment requires politicians to accurately forecast price changes over the subsequent 10 years, and to
choose specific or ad valorem tariffs accordingly, holding the overall level of protection constant.
Figure 6 displays the specific tariff share across counties as of 1900. As is clear from the figure,
the variation across industries described above begets variation across regions. Agriculture and
food products tend to have the highest specific tariff shares, while manufacturing industries rely
less on specific tariffs. As a result, county-average specific tariff shares tend to be highest in the
south and the plains regions, whereas the northeast and west have consistently lower average shares.
Of course, such patterns raise the concern that our measure captures variation in the response to
price changes based not on the tariff code, but some other characteristic of the local economy. We
return to this possibility below.
Figure 7 displays decadal log import growth at the county level for each decade in our sample.
The mean change in county level log real imports is −0.02, with an interquartile range of 0.48. As
is clear from the figure, the first two decades of our sample are characterized by relative increases
in import competition in agricultural-producing regions. This pattern is reversed beginning in the
1920s, with manufacturing heavy locations experiencing relatively faster growth—or, in the case of
19Further, note that county labor Lct captures employment all industries, including nontradable industries without
tariffs. This is equivalent to assuming a specific tariff share equal to zero in such industries. As robustness, we report
results setting Lct equal to employment only in traded industries. This assumes that trade shocks pass through
to nontradable industries, as in Kovak (2013). As we show below, our baseline results are robust to this choice of
weighting.
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Figure 6: County Specific Tariff Shares, 1900
Figure 7: County Import Penetration Growth, 1900-1940
the 1920s, less of a relative decline. The specific tariff shares in Figure 6 combined with the
the price growth from 1900–1920 and declines from 1920–1940 bear a striking resemblance to the
observed change in import growth in Figure 7. We now turn to documenting this relationship
formally.
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3.1 County-Level Effective Protection and Imports
Our labor market analysis regresses local outcomes against increases in county log imports,
∆Ln(Importsct,t+1), instrumenting with ∆EPct,t+1:
Outcomect,t+1 = β0 + β1∆ ̂Ln(Importsct,t+1) + β2Xct + γt + εct (5)
Xct represents a set of controls for CZ characteristics that may otherwise contaminate our estimates.
Before turning to labor market effects directly, in Table 2 we conduct a similar exercise to the
one described in Table 1, this time at the county level.20 This amounts to the first-stage regression
for our subsequent labor market analysis.
In column 1 we regress ∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 against ∆EPctt,t+1 and STSct. As with the industry
specifications, the relationship is negative and statistically significant. By way of interpretation,
note that a 10 percent increase in CPI corresponds to a 3.1 percent increase in imports for the county
at the 75th percentile in terms of STSct relative to the 25th percentile. This is approximately 30
percent of the mean change in county imports across all decades in our sample. In column 2 we
introduce a control for the county ad valorem tariff equivalent. Inclusion of this control reduces
the magnitude of the point estimate of interest slightly but leaves it both statistically significant
and economically meaningful. In column 3, we introduce census region fixed effects to control
for regional differences in import growth throughout the period. Our results are unaffected by
this addition. We note that the start of period AVE tariff, AV Ect, is positively correlated with
subsequent import growth. This is consistent with the idea that labor markets more exposed
to import competition lobby for protectionist policies. This further highlights the value of our
approach.
A primary issue for our analysis is the effect of large, idiosyncratic events such as World War I
or the Great Depression. To ensure that the relationship documented in the table is not driven by
outlier occurrences, in columns 4–7 we repeat the specification from column 3, sequentially omitting
one decade in each column. As is clear from the columns, the relationship is not driven by any
specific decade.
20For all results in this section, we use CPI as our price measure, but note that our results are robust to using
import unit values.
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Table 2: County Log Import Growth and Trade Exposure
∆Ln(Importsct,t+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆EPct,t+1 -1.936∗∗∗ -1.681∗∗∗ -1.656∗∗∗ -1.557∗∗∗ -1.874∗∗∗ -1.539∗∗∗ -1.775∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.036) (0.038) (0.048) (0.050) (0.034) (0.049)
STSct 0.055∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.059∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.017) (0.030) (0.023)
AV Ect 1.021∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.106) (0.164) (0.070) (0.133) (0.135)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE N N Y Y Y Y Y
Years Omitted None None None 1900-1910 1910 - 1920 1920-1930 1930-1940
NOTE: Census industry regressions of log change in real imports against changes in effective pro-
tection from 1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Data from Statistical Abstract of the
United States and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calcula-
tions. AVE, STS measured at the start of decade. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **,
*** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
3.2 Import Growth and Labor Force Participation
We now explore the labor market consequences of exposure to trade. Under this approach, we
use ∆EPctt,t+1 as an instrument for ∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 between 1900 and 1940. Due to the low
share of women in the labor force during this period, we focus exclusively on male outcomes in our
baseline specifications. In Table 3 we regress decadal changes in labor force to population ratios
for men ages 16–64 against ∆ ̂Ln(Imports)ct,t+1. All specifications are weighted by 1900 county
population.
Column 1 includes only our measure of interest and the specific tariff share itself. The results
in the column show that increased import competition reduces county labor market attachment.
The point estimate implies that a 10 percent increase in log imports reduces the county labor
force to population ratio by approximately 0.01—roughly 20 percent of the interqartile range of the
dependent variable. In column 2 we introduce controls for the county AVE tariff. This increases
the magnitude of the point estimate of interest slightly.
A potential concern with our approach is that specific tariff shares are chosen nonrandomly.
While we argue above that it is unlikely that politicians select specific tariffs rather than ad valorem
tariffs for strictly protective reasons, it is possible that industry-specific, and therefore county-
specific tariff shares, are correlated with other economic traits. As discussed above, the southern
and central plains regions had persistently high specific tariff shares. As can be seen in Figure
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Table 3: County Log Import Growth and Changes in Labor Force Participation
∆LaborForcect,t+1
Populationct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.086∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
STSct 0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
AV Ect 0.085 0.079∗ 0.063 0.057 -0.019
(0.054) (0.046) (0.051) (0.056) (0.061)
Farm Sharect 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
MFG Sharect 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.016∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Farm Sharect -0.033∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
×I(1930− 1940) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009)
MFG Sharect -0.020 -0.018 -0.020 -0.012
×I(1930− 1940) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Share Literacyct -0.049 -0.066∗ -0.029
(0.030) (0.035) (0.034)
Share Foreign Bornct -0.015∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Share Non-Whitect -0.024∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Share Under 35ct -0.024 -0.021 -0.012
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE N N N N Y N
Region-Year FE N N N N N Y
Obs 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892
R-Squared 0.136 0.136 0.144 0.148 0.15 0.179
F-Stat 69.2 74.87 48.1 68.4 63.5 676.14
NOTE: Dependent variable is change in labor force to population among men ages 16–64 at the
county level from 1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Import data from Statistical
Abstract of the United States and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and
author’s calculations. Population data from IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2020). Unless otherwise
indicated data controls are measured at start of decade. Import growth is instrumented by
∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period population. Standard
errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
8, this regional variation corresponds closely to the variation in agricultural and manufacturing
employment, with the southern and plains regions focused primarily on agriculture, while manufac-
turing clusters in the north. If industries respond differentially to price shocks—for instance, if the
price elasticity of agricultural output is greater than that for manufacturing—then our estimates
may be biased. We take several steps to address this concern. First, in column 3, we include the
county share of the population that lists “farmer” as an occupation in the 1900 census. Since we are
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running a first difference specification, this amounts to accounting for agricultural trends through-
out our sample.21 Second, because our sample spans the Great Depression and the accompanying
turmoil in the labor market, we include an additional variable that interacts both the farm and
manufacturing shares with a 1930–1940 dummy. This allows for period-specific shocks that may
confound our measure of changes in import growth. The agricultural controls significantly predict
changes in labor force participation, but their inclusion makes little impact on our primary results.
Figure 8: Count Manufacturing and Farm Employment Shares, 1900
NOTE: Figure indicates share of county population that lists “Farmers (owners and
tenants),” “Farm managers,” “Farm foremen,” “Farm laborers, wage workers,” “Farm
laborers, unpaid family workers,” or ‘Farm service laborers, self-employed” as their
occupation. Manufacturing employment corresponds to IPUMS 1990 census industries
100-392.
In column 4 we introduce a number of county-specific, start-of-period measures intended to
control for differential trends in labor market outcomes as a function of local characteristics. These
21Specifically, we identify the share of the population that lists “Farmers (owners and tenants),” “Farm managers,”
“Farm foremen,” “Farm laborers, wage workers,” “Farm laborers, unpaid family workers,” or “Farm service laborers,
self-employed” as their occupation. Manufacturing corresponds to 1990 IPUMS census industries 100–392.
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controls include the share of the population that is literate, the share of the population that is foreign
born, the share of the population that is nonwhite, and the share of the population that is under
age 35. Inclusion of these controls increases the magnitude of the point estimate slightly. Finally,
we directly control for persistent differential labor market trajectories across geographic areas via
census region fixed effects. In column 5 we introduce region fixed effects by themselves. Our results
are largely unaffected by this addition. In column 6—our most restrictive specification—we include
region-by-year fixed effects to account for regional shifts over time. Similar in spirit to the farm and
manufacturing controls in column 3, this addresses the concern that our results might be driven by
variation in broader, regionally clustered sectoral responses to economic shocks. This reduces our
point estimate of interest somewhat, but leaves it statistically significant. The result implies that a
10 percent increase in import reduces the labor force to population share by approximately 0.007,
approximately 16 percent of the interqartile range of growth in county labor force to population
ratios during the sample.
These results suggest that import competition reduced labor force attachment during this pe-
riod. In Table 4, we consider a number of robustness tests of this baseline result. Specifically, we
replicate column 5 of Table 3 with a single modification in each column.
Column 1 represents our baseline result without weighting by start of period population. This
increases the point estimate slightly but has little impact on our findings. In column 2 we re-
construct ∆EPct and use import unit values to construct ι. Our point estimate is comparable to
our baseline result and significant at the 1 percent level. In column 3 we consider an alternative
approach to weighting trade shocks at the local level. Kovak (2013) presents a general equilib-
rium model of trade and local labor markets and argues that shocks to the tradable sector will be
transmitted through prices to the nontradable sector. Within such a framework it is appropriate
to construct ∆EPct,t+1 and ∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 with employment shares solely within the traded
sector. While this weighting reduces the magnitude of the point estimate somewhat, we note that
the interquartile range of county log import changes is approximately 50 percent larger, such that
the interquartile effect is quite similar under the two approaches.
Finally, in our remaining four columns, we sequentially drop each decade in the sample to
further demonstrate that neither heterogeneous exposure to World War I nor the Great Depression
drive our results. This is particularly important as the 1910–1920 period exhibits the greatest price
22

















∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.132∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011)
STSct -0.061∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.027∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
AV Ect 0.150∗∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.133 0.111∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.057
(0.052) (0.057) (0.036) (0.082) (0.063) (0.071) (0.054)
Farm Sharect 0.042∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.005 0.054∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.016 0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
MFG Sharect -0.008 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Farm Sharect -0.046∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ 0.005 -0.036∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.007 0.000
×I(1930− 1940) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (.)
MFG Sharect -0.049∗∗∗ -0.024 0.005 -0.012 -0.030 -0.024 0.000
×I(1930− 1940) (0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (.)
Share Literatect -0.061∗∗∗ -0.066∗ -0.049 -0.044 -0.088∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.017) (0.035) (0.035) (0.052) (0.051) (0.046) (0.011)
Share Foreign Bornct -0.028∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.012∗ 0.002 -0.014 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Share Non-Whitect -0.014∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.016 -0.013 -0.033∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.004)
Share Under 35ct 0.006 -0.025 -0.042∗ -0.059∗∗ 0.017 -0.054∗∗ 0.008
(0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.019)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 11892 11892 11892 9095 8950 8831 8800
R2 0.138 0.148 0.129 0.115 0.125 0.186 .172
NOTE: Dependent variable is change in labor force to population among men ages 16–64 at the county level from
1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Import data from Statistical Abstract of the United States and
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calculations. Population data from IPUMS
Ruggles et al. (2020). Unless otherwise indicated, data controls are measured at start of decade. Import growth
is instrumented by ∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period population. Standard
errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
growth, while the Great Depression led to the most negative price growth. Nonetheless, our key
finding obtains: inflation-driven changes in effective protection affects local labor markets. Even
after conditioning on the initial tariff level, inflation erodes the protective capacity of specific tariffs.
Protection falls, imports rise, and counties experience relative declines in labor force participation.
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4 Other Economic Outcomes
Leaving the labor force entirely is only one potential response to import competition. In this
section we consider other mechanisms of adjustment, including changes in occupation, industry,
and location.
4.1 Income, Occupation, and Industry Switching
In Table 5 we explore whether import growth also impacts income. At the start of our sample, the
federal income tax did not exist. Consequently, we have no direct measures of income. However,
IPUMS does report occupational income scores, which measure the median income within an
occupation. We are thus able to examine whether individuals in counties more exposed to imports
shifted to lower-paying occupations on average.22 In the table, we repeat the specifications from
Table 3 with log changes in average county occupational income—among individuals reporting a
nonzero income—as the outcome. Across all columns, the effect is large and statistically significant.
That is, increases in imports do lead individuals to shift from higher-income occupations to lower-
income occupations, conditional on remaining in the labor force. The results in column 5 indicate
that a 10 percent increase in imports corresponds to a 1.3 percent reduction in occupational income
score growth.
This result suggests labor market adjustment across jobs among those remaining in the labor
force. We explore this directly in Table 6. In the table, we decompose our labor force participation
result from column 5 of Table 3 into shifts across mutually exclusive sectors. For brevity, we include
here only the coefficients from import growth and start of period STS and AVE and suppress all
other covariates.23
Our primary coefficient reveals that the majority of job loss takes place in trade-related sectors.
We observe large reductions in labor force participation in Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Trans-
portation, and find increases in service sectors such as Retail and Construction. The largest effect
by a substantial margin is in manufacturing. It bears repeating that this specification exploits cross
county differences in effective protection within regions. Thus, these results cannot be explained
22Note that the occupational income score is defined based on the 1950 census, and income scores vary across
occupations but not locations or demographic groups.
23Full coefficients are available upon request.
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Table 5: County Log Import Growth and Occupational Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.072∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
STSct 0.100∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.020∗ 0.013 0.010 -0.018
(0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
AVEct 0.558∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.062) (0.057) (0.059) (0.055)
Farm Sharect 0.025∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
MFG Sharect 0.045∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Farm Sharect 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
×I(1930− 1940) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
MFG Sharect -0.028 -0.030 -0.029 -0.017
×I(1930− 1940) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Share Literatect -0.006 -0.001 -0.023
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Share Foreign Bornct -0.037∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Share Non-Whitect -0.017∗∗ -0.014∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Share Under 35ct -0.002 0.050 0.036
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE N N N N Y N
Region-Year FE N N N N N Y
Obs 11889 11889 11889 11889 11889 11889
R-Squared .345 .344 .421 .426 .432 .447
NOTE: Dependent variable is log change in occupational income score among men ages 16–64
at the county level from 1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Import data from
Statistical Abstract of the United States and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United
States and author’s calculations. Population data from IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2020). Unless
otherwise indicated data controls are measured at start of decade. Import growth is instru-
mented by ∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period population.
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01,
respectively.
by aggregate shocks that might differentially affect manufacturing- or agriculture-intensive regions.
These results, combined with the spatial clustering of specific tariffs in the south paints an interest-
ing picture. Among other important points, price growth from 1900–1920 plausibly led an increase
in import competition in the south that may have retarded growth in the manufacturing sector as
compared to some less impacted and northern counterparts.
Beyond endogenous occupation and industry switching, migration offers a potential margin of
adjustment to import competition shocks. However, even in response to large shocks, migration
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Table 6: County Log Import Growth and Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.014∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(-2.96) (-6.07) (2.11) (4.72) (-7.56) (2.11) (1.94) (-6.06)
STSct -0.055∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.001 0.013 0.001 -0.001∗∗∗
(-2.79) (-2.72) (-6.13) (8.63) (0.14) (1.42) (0.25) (-5.28)
AVEct 0.027 -0.017 -0.046 -0.145∗∗∗ 0.013 0.153∗∗∗ 0.070∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.29) (-0.18) (-1.12) (-3.25) (0.28) (5.01) (1.77) (2.36)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892
R2 0.349 0.247 0.075 0.493 0.319 0.523 0.353 0.066
NOTE: Dependent variable is change in share of employment accounted for by different industries among men ages
16–64 at the county level from 1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Import data from Statistical Abstract of
the United States and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calculations. Population
data from IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2020). Unless otherwise indicated data controls are measured at start of decade.
Import growth is instrumented by ∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period population.
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
effects may be muted (Hakobyan and McLaren, 2016; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2019) or masked
by secular migratory trends and sluggish (Greenland, Lopresti, and McHenry, 2019). We explore
the extent to which migration played an important role in the response to import competition
during this period by regressing the change in log county population on import growth, again
instrumented by changes in effective protection. Results are reported in Table 7. Suppressed for
space, we introduce controls sequentially as in Table 6.
Unconditionally, we observe that increased import growth leads to lower population growth.
This effect is partially reduced when accounting for the county AVE in column 2, suggesting that
part of the decline we estimate may be attributable to declines in population in heavily protected
regions. Beginning with column 3, we include controls for agricultural employment and manu-
facturing employment, as well as their interaction with a dummy for the 1930s. Here, and in all
remaining specifications, we observe no migratory responses. Thus, it seems that differential pop-
ulation trends in agricultural regions relative to manufacturing-intensive regions largely explains
migration patterns during our sample, rather than local exposure to trade.
Finally, work by Greenland et al. (2019) points out the masking effect of secular migratory
trends on the migratory responses to labor market shocks. In this spirit, in Panel B we repeat
each of the aforementioned specifications, additionally accounting for lagged population growth.
The results are largely unchanged: import competition does not appear to have driven migratory
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Table 7: County Log Import Growth and Population Growth
Panel A ∆Ln(Population)ct,t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.150∗∗ -0.216∗∗ -0.044 -0.036 -0.053 -0.156
(0.060) (0.098) (0.140) (0.142) (0.137) (0.126)
R2 .111 .111 .132 .140 .195 .226
Panel B ∆Ln(Population)ct,t+1
∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.142∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.030 -0.043 -0.051 -0.166
(0.066) (0.104) (0.145) (0.144) (0.138) (0.121)
∆Ln(Population)ct−1,t 0.247∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052)
R2 .189 .186 .212 .216 .248 .290
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE N N N N Y N
Region-Year FE N N N N N Y
Obs 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892 11892
NOTE: Dependent variable is change in log population at county level from 1900–1910, 1910–
1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Import data from Statistical Abstract of the United States and
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calculations. Population
data from IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2020). Columns sequentially include controls from Table
3: (1) STS (2) AVE (3) Agriculture and Manufacturing Controls (4) Demographic Controls.
Unless otherwise indicated data controls are measured at start of decade. Import growth is
instrumented by ∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period popu-
lation. Standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05,
p < 0.01, respectively.
patterns during our sample.
There are several potential explanations for this finding. First, during our sample labor market
integration is low and transportation costs are high. This likely makes population adjustments to
trade shocks costly, due both to information acquisition and to the spatial clustering of economic
activity. One might have to travel a considerable distance to find labor markets with substantially
different exposure to changes in effective protection than one’s own labor market. Second, given the
potentially transitory nature of our shock (prices may increase one decade and decrease the next)
and the sunk costs associated with migration, workers may be less inclined to leave a labor market
if they expect that prices may revert in some future period. In continuing work we are further
investigating this issue by looking at linked census data in which we directly observe individual
migration decisions.
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4.2 Who Bears the Costs of Import Growth?
Finally, we consider which groups are most exposed to changes in import competition, replicating
both our labor force participation and occupational income results across various subgroups. We
find important differences by age, race, and across the urban rural divide. We begin with labor
force participation in Table 8.
Table 8: County Import Penetration and Labor Force Participation by Subgroups
∆LaborForcect,t+1
Populationct
15-34 35-54 55-64 White Black Foreign Born Urban Rural
∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.211∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.074∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.037∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(-15.39) (0.55) (-6.28) (-10.30) (-3.41) (-0.78) (-1.90) (-10.49)
STSct -0.080∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.018 -0.043∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.034∗ -0.016 -0.070∗∗∗
(-5.32) (-0.18) (-1.32) (-3.70) (-2.34) (-1.93) (-0.74) (-5.87)
AV Ect 0.220∗∗∗ -0.118∗ -0.086 0.037 -0.084 -0.249∗∗ -0.125 0.216∗∗∗
(3.62) (-1.85) (-0.99) (0.59) (-1.09) (-1.96) (-1.40) (4.59)
Share Literatect -0.072∗∗ -0.059 -0.123∗∗ -0.067 0.030 -0.144 -0.148 -0.046∗∗∗
(-2.57) (-1.45) (-2.15) (-1.51) (1.39) (-1.37) (-1.25) (-3.07)
Share Foreign Bornct -0.015∗∗ -0.004 -0.028∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.013 -0.027∗∗∗
(-2.09) (-0.83) (-2.32) (-2.76) (3.07) (-2.57) (-0.97) (-3.47)
Share Non-Whitect -0.027∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.036∗∗ -0.020 0.003 -0.053∗ -0.054 -0.016∗∗∗
(-2.94) (-1.47) (-2.16) (-1.59) (0.38) (-1.66) (-1.61) (-3.43)
Share Under 35ct -0.122∗∗∗ 0.000 0.017 -0.017 -0.040∗ 0.036 -0.059 -0.010
(-5.43) (0.02) (0.54) (-0.77) (-1.78) (1.25) (-1.17) (-0.66)
Farm Sharect 0.066∗∗∗ 0.012 0.032∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(4.64) (1.31) (3.29) (4.61) (4.49) (2.88) (1.75) (6.78)
MFG Sharect 0.009 0.020∗ 0.023 0.016 0.022 0.035∗∗ 0.020 0.010
(0.53) (1.95) (1.29) (1.42) (1.43) (2.09) (1.17) (1.15)
Farm Sharect -0.058∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.024∗ -0.028∗∗ 0.004 0.046∗∗ 0.018 -0.033∗∗∗
×I(1930− 1940) (-2.64) (1.07) (-1.78) (-2.14) (0.29) (2.15) (0.81) (-2.73)
MFG Sharect -0.053 0.022 -0.004 -0.018 0.017 0.042 0.020 -0.048∗∗∗
×I(1930− 1940) (-1.52) (1.27) (-0.16) (-0.93) (0.61) (1.33) (0.60) (-2.96)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 11892 11890 11852 11892 9277 10646 5571 11759
R2 0.288 0.162 0.219 0.129 0.283 0.145 0.062 0.188
NOTE: Dependent variable change in labor force participation among men ages 16–64 by demographic group at the
county level from 1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940. Import data from Statistical Abstract of the United
States and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calculations. Population data from
IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2020). Unless otherwise indicated data controls are measured at start of decade. Import
growth is instrumented by ∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period population. Standard
errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
Overall the table indicates that it is the youngest workers who bear the costs of rising import
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competition, with the effect among the individuals ages 15–34 twice the size of our baseline result.
Individuals ages 35–54 seem to be unaffected, while those 55 and older exit the labor force in
response to trade shocks, albeit at a much lower rate than the youngest individuals. The effects
are similar in magnitude for black and white men, while the effect on rural workers is four times
as large as their urban counterparts. Given the sizeable reliance of agriculture on specific tariffs, it
is perhaps not surprising that rural workers experience the largest loss in labor force attachment.
In Table 9, we turn to income scores by group. As before, we condition on a positive income, so
that those who leave the labor force will by definition not be included. The effects we observe here
are noticeably different from those for employment. We observe no occupational switching among
the youngest individuals, and the largest response among the middle age group. Similarly, we find
large effects among the urban population and no statistically significant effect for rural individuals.
This suggests that as import competition rises, there is a general diminishing of labor market
opportunities. Those at the bottom end of the income distribution—the very young and those in
less vibrant economic locales—reduce attachment to the labor force entirely. Those at higher levels
of the income distribution remain in the labor force but see their occupational standing reduced.
We intend to further explore these results in linked census data in the future.
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Table 9: County Import Penetration and Income, Subgroups
15-34 35-54 55-64 White Black Foreign Born Urban Rural
∆Ln(Imports)ct,t+1 -0.012 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.035
(-0.65) (-11.40) (-4.06) (-2.99) (-2.22) (-5.75) (-6.17) (-1.20)
STSct 0.028∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.019 0.007 -0.089∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(1.74) (-2.39) (1.52) (0.54) (-3.02) (-6.48) (-1.98) (-3.31)
AV Ect -0.005 0.353∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.109∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(-0.07) (5.23) (3.25) (1.75) (3.08) (3.97) (2.17) (4.17)
Share Literatect 0.025 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.027 0.003 -0.021 -0.164∗∗∗ 0.008 0.004
(0.88) (-3.48) (-0.98) (0.14) (-0.89) (-2.77) (0.35) (0.22)
Share Foreign Bornct -0.047∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.038∗∗∗
(-4.28) (-3.64) (-1.45) (-5.33) (-1.74) (-2.92) (-0.66) (-4.02)
Share Non-Whitect -0.013 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.024∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.040∗ 0.011 -0.012
(-1.27) (-3.36) (-0.66) (-2.28) (-2.26) (-1.87) (1.08) (-1.61)
Share Under 35ct -0.028 -0.027 0.001 0.075∗∗ -0.065∗∗ 0.030 0.068∗ 0.050∗
(-0.72) (-0.92) (0.02) (2.20) (-1.99) (0.77) (1.87) (1.68)
Farm Sharect 0.023∗ 0.021∗ -0.005 0.028∗∗∗ 0.032 0.091∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.005
(1.84) (1.95) (-0.38) (2.71) (1.35) (6.46) (5.77) (-0.34)
MFG Sharect 0.053∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.021
(4.24) (1.98) (1.77) (4.64) (-3.51) (1.65) (2.71) (0.83)
Farm Sharect 0.187∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.052∗∗∗ 0.010
×I(1930− 1940) (11.59) (6.11) (3.51) (9.81) (3.08) (-1.34) (-3.46) (0.47)
MFG Sharect -0.042 -0.030 -0.018 -0.027 0.148∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.018
×I(1930− 1940) (-1.31) (-1.42) (-0.73) (-1.16) (2.61) (-4.62) (-1.59) (-0.50)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obs 11889 11887 11848 11889 9171 10572 5567 11756
R2 0.389 0.374 0.277 0.423 0.157 0.208 0.379 0.394
NOTE: Dependent variable is log change in occupational income score among men ages 16–64 at the county level
from 1900–1910, 1910–1920, 1920–1930, 1930–1940 by demographic group.. Import data from Statistical Abstract of
the United States and Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States and author’s calculations. Population
data from IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2020). Unless otherwise indicated data controls are measured at start of decade.
Import growth is instrumented by ∆EPct,t+1 as Equation (4). Regressions weighted by start of period population.
Standard errors clustered at the state level. *, **, *** indicate p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a novel approach to measuring exposure to import competition. By
interacting price changes with a measure of the preexisting variation in the prevalence of specific
rather than ad valorem tariffs, we construct a measure of tariff exposure at the industry and
county level that varies substantially over time, even in the absence of changes to policy. We show
that our measure predicts import growth at the industry and local level, and predicts subsequent
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county-level labor market outcomes. Labor force participation and occupational income declines
in response to import competition, particularly in tradable sectors.
We are currently pursuing several extensions of this approach. First, we intend to take advan-
tage of the availability of linked census data during this period to explore the response to import
exposure at the individual level over the very long run. As a part of this, we hope to explore the
intergenerational effect of trade shocks by linking sons to their fathers. Second, we are currently
exploring the effect of exogenous variation in trade exposure on congressional voting on trade bills
throughout the twentieth century. This is a particularly attractive possibility given the ability of
our measure to avoid standard concerns related to the endogeneity of trade policy. Finally, we hope
to expand our approach to modern data, taking advantage of more complete micro data to explore
the response to exogenous trade variation in the absence of major policy shifts.
We believe this is a small set of the potential applications for this approach. Numerous countries,
not just the early twentieth century United States, employ specific tariffs. And even within the
United States, the inflationary effects of trade shocks are exploitable well beyond the 1940s, as
specific tariffs were fixed in 1930 and have since remained unaltered.24 Finally, this period is a
particuarly rich policy environment in which to explore the relationship of trade to a variety of
government activities. The ability of governments to alleviate the negative consequences of trade
is of first order importance for trade economists. Policy movements during this period on matters
of unionization, voting rights, educational standards, and the social safety net provide the sort of
empirical variation that economists require to explore this important topic. The method proposed
here thus provides an opportunity to explore not merely trade shocks, but also the additional effects
of a a rich set of coincident policy interventions.
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